
CHIARA BELLETTI

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FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Economics, Business Economics, Digital Economics, Digital Marketing, Economics of Information Systems, Industrial Organization, Platform Strategy, Quantitative Marketing

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

PostDoctoral Researcher, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL Governance and Regulation Chair	2025-
PostDoctoral Researcher, LMU Munich Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization	2024-2025

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Télécom Paris (IP Paris, CREST) Supervisor: Prof. Ulrich Laitenberger Thesis committee: Marc Bourreau, Jose de Sousa, Tobias Kretschmer	2021-2024
Visiting PhD Student, Institute for Strategy Technology and Organization (LMU) Visiting Prof. Tobias Kretschmer	Fall 2023
Visiting PhD Student, ZEW Mannheim Visiting Prof. Irene Bertschek	Fall 2021
M.Sc. in Economics and Political Science, Università Statale di Milano Visiting Student SciencesPo Paris (M.Res. Economics) - Fall 2018	2017-2019
B.Sc. in International Affairs, Università di Trieste Visiting Student Jagiellonian University Krakow (2016)	2014-2017

SELECTED RESEARCH

Job Market Paper: Rating Systems and the End-Game Effect: When Reputation Works and When It Does Not

Joint with Elizaveta Pronkina (Amazon) and Michelangelo Rossi (HEC Paris)

Reject and Resubmit at Marketing Science (resubmitted)

Abstract: Do rating systems provide incentives when sellers are about to exit a market? Using data from Airbnb, this paper examines how end-game considerations influence hosts effort decisions and how these effects depend on accumulated reputation capital. We exploit the implementation of the Home-Sharing Ordinance in Los Angeles, which forced ineligible hosts to leave the platform, to identify sellers who could anticipate their imminent exit. Effort is measured through guest ratings in categories directly tied to host behavior (*communication*, *check-in*, and *cleanliness*) and compared to ratings on *location*, which are unaffected by effort. In a Difference-in-Differences framework, we find that effort-related ratings decline significantly in the final transactions of exiting hosts, with larger reductions among listings holding stronger reputational capital or longer review histories. At the same time, competitive pressure from neighboring listings with strong reputation mitigates these declines: when nearby competitors have high ratings, hosts face higher reputational costs from underperforming even as they approach exit. These findings reveal that the effectiveness of reputation systems erodes near market exit, yet the competitive pressure from highly rated nearby listings can partially sustain service quality and trust on digital platforms.

Quality Provision in Crowd-sourced Data Annotation Tasks: Evidence from a Structural Model

Joint with Louis Daniel Pape (Télécom Paris)

Abstract: Micro-tasking platforms enable the collection of data used to train machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence. However, a classical Principal-Agent problem may limit the quality of the data produced by micro-taskers as firms do not always monitor the quality of the work done with sufficient frequency. We develop a structural model of equilibrium demand and supply of effort to measure quality and monitoring behavior. We estimate the parameters of this model using proprietary data from a leading micro-tasking platform. We find that metrics relying on observed task rejection severely underestimate the quality/effort with which data annotation tasks are performed. This suggests AI is being built with mis-annotated data. We discuss several mitigation strategies. We find that increasing the pay of micro-taskers along with more frequent monitoring could help improve the quality of the data. Finally, we discuss incentive schemes to induce higher quality work by relying on counter-factual simulations. We show that charging penalties for workers with a rejected task could induce higher effort and require less monitoring from the firms.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Can Platform Integration Mitigate Discovery Loss in the Digital Consumption Funnel?

Joint with Denzel Glandel (LMU Munich), Tobias Kretschmer (Imperial College & LMU Munich)

Replaceables? Profile Restarting on Digital Platforms. Evidence from the Short-Term Rental Market

Joint with Joerg Claussen (LMU Munich), Michail Batikas (NOVA Lisbon)

Picky Drivers: Reputation and Selectivity on a Car-Pooling Platform

Joint with Dianzhuo Zhu (University of Lille)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

1. Belletti C., Laitenberger U., Erdsiek D. and Tubaro P. (2021), Crowdfunding in France and Germany, [ZEW expert brief Nr. 21-09](#).
2. Belletti C. and Norbiato R. (2021) Country chapter Italy, in Spasova S., Ghailani D., Sabato S. and Vanhercke B., [Social Protection of Non-Standard Workers and the Self-Employed During the Pandemic](#).

CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

2025: Digital Working Group Seminar (GovReg Chair Paris Dauphine - online), AFREN Summer School (Nanterre)

2024: Digital Economy Workshop Rotterdam, Paris Conference in Digital Economics, Workshop on Digital Markets Tilburg, TIME Seminar (LMU, MPI, TUM), AFREN Summer School (Rennes)

2023: ORG Seminar (LMU), INDL Conference (Weizenbaum Institute Berlin), AFREN Summer School (Avignon), Workshop Economics of Digitization (Liege)

2022: Airbnb Workshop (Université Côte d'Azur), CESifo Area Conference Economics of Digitization, EARIE (Vienna), ZEW Conference on ICT (Doctoral Workshop), AFREN Summer School (Louvain La Neuve)

2021: AFREN Doctoral Workshop (Télécom Paris), Crowdfunding Symposium (University of Bremen - Online)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Project Course: Strategy, Technology, and Organization (LMU)	2024-2025
Empirics of Organization (LMU)	2024-2025
Coordinator - Prep Course in Data Analytics with DataCamp	2024-2025
Teaching Assistant - Applied Econometrics (Télécom Paris)	2022-2023
Teaching Assistant - Economics of Digital Platforms (Télécom Paris)	2021-2023
Supervisor - 5 Bachelor Theses (LMU School of Management)	2024

INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

Business Analyst at Deloitte Consulting (Milan)	2020
Research Intern, European Social Observatory (Brussels)	Spring 2019

ACADEMIC SERVICES

Referee for Journals and Conferences

International Conference on Information Systems	2024-2025
Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research	2025
European Journal of Information Systems	2024

Discussant at Conferences

Paris Conference in Digital Economics	2025
Munich Summer Institute	2024
Research on Innovation, Science and Entrepreneurship (RISE) Workshop	2024

Events Organization

Session chair at the Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy (IOEA)	2025
Support to the organization of the Paris Conference in Digital Economics	2023-2024

Projects Coordination

Scientific coordination of the BlaBlaModes project (collaboration with BlaBlaCar)	Since 2025
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SKILLS

Programming skills: Stata, Python, $\text{\LaTeX}$, SQL (beginner)

Languages: Italian (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)

REFERENCES

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- Tobias Kretschmer (LMU & Imperial College)
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 - Michelangelo Rossi (HEC Paris)
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 - Ulrich Laitenberger (Tilburg University)
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