

# List of Publications

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## Books:

1. *The Stability of Belief. How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 384 pp.
2. *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Congress* (edited, with I. Niiniluoto, P. Seppel, E. Sober), College Publications, 2017, 468 pp.
3. *Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis* (edited, with A. Hieke), Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2009, 414 pp.
4. *Reduction. Between the Mind and the Brain* (edited, with A. Hieke), Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2009, 216 pp.
5. *Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions* (edited, with V. Hendricks), Automatic Press, 2007, 342 pp.
6. *Inference on the Low Level. An Investigation into Deduction, Non-monotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, Applied Logic Series, 2004, 384 pp.
7. *Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik*, Salzburg: Österreichische Hochschülerschaft, 2004, 83 pp. (based on lectures given to the Department of Mathematics, University of Salzburg, in the summer semester 2002).

## Journal Articles:

1. “A Defense of Logicism” (with E. Zalta and U. Nodelman), forthcoming in the *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic*, 65 pages.

2. “Vindicating the Verifiability Criterion”, *Philosophical Studies* 181 (2024), 223–45.
3. “Axioms for Type-Free Subjective Probability” (with C. Cieśliński and L. Horsten), *Review of Symbolic Logic* 17/2 (2024), 493–508.
4. “Ramsification and Semantic Indeterminacy”, *Review of Symbolic Logic* 16/3 (2023), 900–950.
5. “On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study (Part B)”, *Philosophia Mathematica* 29/1 (2021), 64–87.
6. “A Structural Justification of Probabilism: From Partition Invariance to Subjective Probability”, *Philosophy of Science* 88/2 (2021), 341–365.
7. “On Non-Eliminative Structuralism. Unlabeled Graphs as a Case Study (Part A)”, *Philosophia Mathematica* 28/3 (2020), 317–346.
8. “Why Pure Mathematical Truths Are Metaphysically Necessary: A Set-theoretic Explanation”, *Synthese* 197 (2020), 3113–3120.
9. “HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic (With an Application to Semantic Paradoxes)”, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 48/2 (2019), 305–405.
10. “Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth” (with C. Campbell-Moore and L. Horsten), *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 48 (2019), 87–112.
11. “Imaging All the People”, *Episteme* 14/4 (2017), 463–479.
12. “The Humean Thesis on Belief”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society of Philosophy* 89/1 (2015), 143–185.
13. “A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 89/3 (2014), 605–636.
14. “The Review Paradox. A Note on the Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction”, *Nous* 48/4 (2014), 781–793.
15. “A Way Out of the Preface Paradox?”, *Analysis* 74/1 (2014), 11–15.

16. “The Stability Theory of Belief”, *The Philosophical Review* 123/2 (2014), 131–171.
17. “Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief”, *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 164 (2013), 1338–1389.
18. “Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All That”, *Metaphilosophy* 44/3 (2013), 267–275.
19. “Criteria of Identity, Strong and Wrong”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 64/1 (2013), 61–68.
20. “Revision Revisited” (with L. Horsten, G. Leigh, P. Welch), *Review of Symbolic Logic* 5/4 (2012), 642–664.
21. “How Serious is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?” (with S. Duca), *Mind* 121/481 (2012), 1–36.
22. “A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B”, *Review of Symbolic Logic* 5 (2012), 85–121.
23. “A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A”, *Review of Symbolic Logic* 5 (2012), 16–84.
24. “God – Moore = Ramsey. (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)”, *Topoi* 30/1 (2011), 47–51.
25. “New Life for Carnap’s *Aufbau*?” , *Synthese* 180/2 (2011), 265–299.
26. “Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things”, *Synthese* (2011) 179/2, 339–350.  
(The paper will also appear in: V. Hendricks et al. (eds.), *PHIBOOK*, Yearbook of Philosophical Logic, Copenhagen: Automatic Press.)
27. “On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality”, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 51/1 (2010), 21–54.
28. “Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics”, *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 27/2 (2010), special issue on Logic and Philosophy Today, A. Gupta and J. van Benthem (eds.), 129–154.

29. “Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence”, *Analysis* 70/2 (2010), 203–205.
30. “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy” (with R. Pettigrew), *Philosophy of Science* 77/2 (2010), 236–272.
31. “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy” (with R. Pettigrew), *Philosophy of Science* 77/2 (2010), 201–235.
32. “Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology” (with J. Ladyman), *Philosophia Mathematica* 16/3 (2008), 388–396.
33. “On the Probabilistic Convention T”, *Review of Symbolic Logic* 1/2 (2008), 218–224.
34. “Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without  $\sigma$ -Additivity” (with G. Schurz), *Studia Logica* 89/2 (2008), 257–283.
35. “An Impossibility Result on Semantic Resemblance”, *dialectica* 62/3 (2008), 293–306.
36. “Beliefs in Conditionals vs. Conditional Beliefs”, *Topoi* 26/1 (2007), 115–132.
37. “Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Why, How, and Where to?” (with K. Segerberg), *Synthese KRA* 155/2 (2007), 167–190.
38. “A New Analysis of Quasianalysis”, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 36/2 (2007), 181–226.
39. “What Theories of Truth Should Be Like (But Cannot Be)”, *Blackwell Philosophy Compass* 2/2 (2007), 276–290.
40. “When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments” (with D. Bradley), *Analysis* 66.2 (2006), 119–127. The article is reprinted in: A. Eagle (ed.), *Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings*, Routledge, 2009.

41. “Paradox by (Non-Wellfounded) Definition”, *Analysis* 65.4 (2005), 275–278. (Translated into Serbo-Croatian by Sandro Skansi for the journal *Scopus*, X/22, 2006, 96–103.)
42. “Hodges’ Theorem Does Not Account for Determinacy of Translation. A Reply to Werning”, *Erkenntnis* 62 (2005), 411–425.
43. Introduction to special issue of *Synthese* on “Non-monotonic and Uncertain Reasoning in the Focus of Paradigms of Cognition” (with G. Schurz), *Synthese* 146 (2005), 1–5.
44. “Interpreted Dynamical Systems and Qualitative Laws: From Inhibition Networks to Evolutionary Systems”, *Synthese* 146 (2005), 189–202.
45. “What Truth Depends On”, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 34/2 (2005), 155–192.
46. “Circular Languages” (with A. Hieke), *The Journal of Logic, Language and Information* 13 (2004), 341–371.
47. “Was ist ein wissenschaftliches Paradigma? Zur Explikation des Paradigmenbegriffes” (with N. Gratzl), *Conceptus* 36/89–90 (2004), 1–42.
48. “Possible Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates” (with V. Halbach, P.D. Welch), *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 32/2 (2003), 179–223.
49. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning by Inhibition Nets II”, *International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems* 11, suppl. issue 2 (2003), 105–135.
50. “What is a Self-Referential Sentence? Critical Remarks on the Alleged (Non-)Circularity of Yablo’s Paradox”, *Logique et Analyse* 177–178 (2002), 3–14.
51. “Truth as Translation (Part B)”, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 30/4 (2001), 309–328.
52. “Truth as Translation (Part A)”, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 30/4 (2001), 281–307.

53. “No Future” (with L. Horsten), *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 30/3 (2001), 259–265.
54. “Theories of Truth which have no Standard Models”, *Studia Logica* 68/1 (2001), 69–87.
55. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning by Inhibition Nets”, *Artificial Intelligence* 128/1-2 (2001), 161–201.
56. “New Results on the Network Semantics for Cumulative Systems of Nonmonotonic Reasoning”, *Informatikberichte* 287-8/2001 (2001), 37–52.
57. “Truth and the Liar in De Morgan-Valued Models”, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 40/4 (1999), 496–514.
58. “The Neuro-Glial Synchronisation Hypothesis” (with B. Mitterauer, H. Reitböck), *Recent Res. Dev. in Biological Cybernetics* 1 (1996), 137–155.
59. “A Class of n-Valued Statement Calculi: Many Universes Statement Calculus”, *Kriterion* 11 (1996), 3–15.

Articles in Books and Conference Volumes:

1. “Logic and Philosophy. A Reconstruction”, to appear in the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic*, edited by E. Brendel, M. Carrara, F. Ferrari, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, F. Steinberger.
2. “On Potential Infinity in Arithmetic” (with A. Hieke), to appear in a volume edited by N. Gatzl and S. Huttegger.
3. “Stability and the Lottery Paradox”, in: I. Douven (Ed.), *Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 147–170.
4. “Exact Truthmaking as Inexact Truthmaking by Minimal Totality Facts”, in: A. Giordani and J. Malinowski (Eds.), *Logic in High Definition. Trends in Logical Semantics, Trends in Logic* 56, Cham: Springer, 2021 67–75.

5. “Neural Network Models of Conditionals”, in: S.O. Hansson and V.F. Hendricks (eds.), *Introduction to Formal Philosophy*, Berlin: Springer, 2018, 147–176.
6. “Abstraction Grounded. A Note on Abstraction and Truth”, in: P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (eds.), *Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 269–282.
7. “A Bridge Principle for Ranking Functions and Subjective Probability”, in: W. Freitag et al. (eds.), *Von Rang und Namen. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn*, Münster: Mentis, 2017, 243–253.
8. “Probability in Logic”, in: A. Hájek and C. Hitchcock (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 681–704.
9. “Belief as Qualitative Probability”, in: C.E. Crangle, A. García de la Sienra, H.E. Longino (eds.), *Foundations and Methods from Mathematics to Neuroscience. Essays Inspired by Patrick Suppes*, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2014, 119–130.
10. “Belief as a Simplification of Probability, and What This Entails”, in: A. Baltag and S. Smets (eds.), *Johan van Benthem on Logical and Information Dynamics*, Outstanding Contributions to Logic 5, Berlin: Springer, 2014, 405–417.
11. “The Stability Theory of Belief. A Summary” (extended abstract), in: J. van Benthem and F. Liu (eds.), *Logic Across the University: Foundations and Applications*, Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference at Beijing 2013, Volume 47: Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 2013, 47–54.
12. “Comments on Feng Ye, ‘Introduction to a Naturalistic Philosophy of Mathematics’ ”, in: J. van Benthem and F. Liu (eds.), *Logic Across the University: Foundations and Applications*, Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference at Beijing 2013, Volume 47: Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 123–127.
13. “Metacognition and Indicative Conditionals: A Précis”, in: M.J. Beran, J. Brandl, J. Perner, and J. Proust (eds.), *Foundations of Metacognition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 252–266.

14. “From Type-Free Truth to Type-Free Probability”, in: G. Restall and G. Russell (eds.), *New Waves in Philosophical Logic*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 84–93.
15. “Mechanizing Induction” (with R. Ortner), in: D. Gabbay, S. Hartmann, and J. Woods (eds.), *Handbook of the History of Logic*, Vol. 10: *Inductive Logic*, Oxford: North Holland (Elsevier), 2011, 719–772.
16. “Mengers Logik für Ethik und Moral: Nichts von Sollen, nichts von Güte, nichts von Sinnlosigkeit” (with A. Siegetsleitner), in: A. Siegetsleitner (ed.), *Logischer Empirismus, Werte und Moral. Eine Neubewertung*, Vienna/New York: Springer, 2010, 197–218.
17. “On Formal and Informal Provability”, in: Ø. Linnebo and O. Bueno (eds.), *New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 263–299.
18. “How Abstraction Works” (with L. Horsten), in: A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (eds.), *Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis*, Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2009, 217–226.
19. “Towards a Logic of Type-Free Modality and Truth”, in: C. Dimitracopoulos et al. (eds.), *Logic Colloquium 05*, Lecture Notes in Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 68–84.
20. “On the Metatheory of Field’s ‘Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge’”, in: Jc Beall (ed.), *The Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 159–183.
21. “Neural Network Models of Conditionals: An Introduction”, in: X. Arzola, J. M. Larrazabal et al. (eds.), *LogKCA-07*, Proceedings of the First ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action, Bilbao: University of the Basque Country Press, 2007, 191–223.
22. “Struktur und Symbol”, in: H. Schmidinger and C. Sedmak (eds.), *Der Mensch – ein animal symbolicum?*, Topologien des Menschlichen IV, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, 131–147.



23. “Argument und Beweis”, in: G. Kreuzbauer and G. Dorn (eds.), *Argumentation in Theorie und Praxis: Philosophie und Didaktik des Argumentierens*, Wien: Lit-Verlag 2006, 31–39.
24. “How to Parry Goodman’s Seven Strictures on Similarity”, in: O. Neumaier, C. Sedmak, and M. Zichy (eds.), *Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der ÖGP*, Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2005, 364–370.
25. “How Similarities Compose”, in: M. Werning, E. Machery, and G. Schurz (eds.), *The Compositionality of Meaning and Content I: Foundational Issues*, Frankfurt: Ontos, 2005, 147–167.
26. “Possible Worlds Semantics for Predicates” (with V. Halbach, P.D. Welch), R. Kahle (ed.), *Intensionality*, Lecture Notes in Logic, ASL, 2005, 20–41.
27. “Der formale Kalkül SK samt Semantik” and “Die alternative Formalisierung SK2 samt Semantik” (with E. Morscher), in: E. Morscher (ed.), *Was heißt es, ein Recht auf etwas zu haben? Stig und Helle Kangers Analyse der Menschenrechte*, Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2004, 57–70 and 77–83.
28. “A Proxy-Function Argument for the Indeterminacy of Meaning”, in: A. Hieke and O. Neumaier (eds.), *Philosophie im Geiste Bolzanos*, Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2003, 293–300.
29. “Metaphysical Modalities in Scientific Language: A Roadmap of (Im-) Possibilities”, in: H. Rott, V. Horak (eds.), *Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic*, Frankfurt a.M.: Ontos, 2003, 187–219.
30. “Poppers Wahrheitstheorie(n)”, in: E. Morscher (ed.), *Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem 100. Geburtstag*, Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2002, 185–217.
31. “Metaworlds: A Possible Worlds Semantics of Truth”, in: V. Halbach, L. Horsten (eds.), *Principles of Truth*, Epistemische Studien, Frankfurt a.M.: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 2002, 129–151.

32. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning as a Section of a Theory of Rationality”, in: B. Brogaard (ed.), *Rationality and Irrationality*, Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2000, 252–258.

Reviews:

1. Review of: R. Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, Berlin: Weltkreis, 1928, in: *Topoi* 28/2 (2009), 163–165.
2. Review of: N. Unwin, *Aiming at Truth*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, in: *Philosophical Books* 49/4 (2008), Basil Blackwell Publishing, 384–386.
3. Review of: V.F. Hendricks and J. Symons, *Formal Philosophy*, Automatic Press, 2005, in: *Philosophy in Review* 27/4 (2007), 266–268.
4. Review of: E. Köhler et al. (eds.), *Kurt Gödel. Wahrheit & Beweisbarkeit*, vol. I and II, Vienna: öbv et hpt, 2002, in: *Philosophia Mathematica* 15/2 (2007), 245–257.
5. Review of: Timothy Williamson, *Knowledge and its Limits* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, in: *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 65 (2002), 195–205.
6. Eight reviews for the *Mathematical Reviews*, American Mathematical Society (see <http://www.ams.org/>).

Published Abstracts:

1. “On Truth and Probability”, *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 15/1 (2009), 98.
2. “A Type-Free Theory of Modality and Truth”, *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 12/2 (2006), 320.
3. “Semantic dependence for type-free truth, modality, and membership”, *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 12/1 (2006), 160–161.
4. “Paradoxes for Tense logic” (with L. Horsten), *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 7/1 (2001), 119.

5. “The Possible Worlds of Semantically Closed Languages”, *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 6/1 (2000), 118.
6. “Truth Predicates Defined by Translations”, *The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 5/1 (1999), 120–121.

Other Publications:

1. “Why Mathematical Philosophy?”, forthcoming in the *Revista de la Escuela de Filosofa*, University of Costa Rica.
2. “Rudolf Carnap” (with A. Carus), entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carnap/>, 2020, 324 pdf pages.
3. “Humanismus im postfaktischen Zeitalter?”, Festrede zur 400-Jahr-Feier des akademischen Gymnasiums Salzburg, November 2017.
4. “Was ist Logik?”, *Fatum. Magazin für Philosophie der Wissenschaft, Technik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2015), 7.
5. “Eine außergewöhnliche Kombination!”, *Widerspruch – Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 53 (2011), 123–127.
6. “Reseaux de neurones capables de raisonner”, *Dossier Pour la Science* (special issue of the French edition of the *Scientific American*) October/December 2005, 97–101.

In Preparation or Under Review:

1. Under review: “When Rules Define Logical Operators. Rules as Second-Order Definitions”.
2. Under review: “The Additive Logic of Epistemic Reasons. An Axiomatic Account”.
3. In preparation: “Semantic Analyticity and Carnapian Logicism”.
4. In preparation: “On (Two Types of) Instrumental Devices” (with G. Schiemer).

5. In preparation: “Explaining Neural Networks by Reasons” (with L. Hornischer).
6. In preparation: *Reviving Logical Empiricism*. (Monograph.)
7. In preparation: *Logik für Philosophen: Eine Einführung in die klassische Aussagen- und Prädikatenlogik*. 334 pp. I use the draft for my Logic 1 lecture in Munich.